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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
ADVERSE PossEssION-TENANTS IN COMM ON-INCEPION OF HOSTILTY.A father died leaving seven children as heirs to his farm. Since 1883, the
plaintiff, who was the eldest son. had been in continuous and exclusive Dossession, paying all the taxes and taking all the profits without rendering any
account to his co-heirs. Before 1883, the plaintiff had rebuilt the house on
the premises, and in xgoi, he built a barn on the place. In a suit to quiet
title, it was held, that it was a permissible inference from all the evidence
that the plaintiff had gained title by adverse-possession. Hahn v. Keith et al.,
(Wis., I919) 174 N. W. 551.
Where one of several heirs remains in exclusive possession on the death
of the ancestor, his possession will be deemed to be for the benefit of his
co-heirs. Shaw et al. v. Schoonover, 130 Ill. 448; Jackson v. Benjamin, 8
Johns. ioi. The possession of a co-tenant, permissive at its inception, may,
however, become adverse. McCall v. Webb, 88 Pa. i5o. But to render such
possession adverse, there must be some act eqdivalent to an ouster. Tullock
v. Worrall, 49 Pa. 133. Mere possession by one co-tenant, accompanied by
no act which will amount to an ouster, ought not to be cbnstrued into an
adverse possession. ANGELL, LIMh'TATIONS, 463; McClurg v. Ross, 5 Wheat.
1x6. The possession must be accompanied by a notorious claim of an exclusive right. - Tullock v. Worrall, supra. The majdrity opinion in the principal case evidently confused the law relative to the adverse possession of
strangers with that of co-tenants. As pointed out by the dissenting opinion
(in which two justices concurred), the two cases, which were cited in the
report in support of the proposition that twenty years of continuous and
exclusive possession will raise a presumption of hostility against the true
owner, did not involve controversies between co-tenants. 'Bartlett v. Secor,
56 Wis. 52o; Meyer v. Hope, ioz Wis. 123. As to what evidence is sufficient
to warrant the finding of an ouster, there seems to be a diversity of opinn.
Staking out the land and setting up fishing nets; leasing parts of the
premises to a stranger with the knowledge of the co-tenant and receiving the
rents without accounting for them; forbidding the entry of a co-tenant;
making substantial improvements; and, pernancy of the rents and profits
for thirty years, have been held to be sufficient. Chabert. v. Russell, lo9
Mich. 571; Law v. Patterson, x W. and S. (Pa.) z86; Gordon v. Pearson, I
Mass. 323; Beitz et al. v. Buendiger et al. 174 N. W. (Minn.) 44o; LaFountain v. Dee, iio Mich. 374. But pernancy of profits for twenty-six years
was held to be insufficient. Warlield et al. v. Lindell, 30 Mo. 272. See, too,
Winsett v. Winsett, (Ala., igig) 83 So. 117. According to the view of the
dissenting opinion in the principal case, there was no act which could be
referred to as indicative of the inception of hostility. The house was not
rebuilt at a time when the plaintiff had the exclusive possession; and if the
building of the barn were to be taken as marking the inception of hostility,
then the statutory period had not yet run. One court has gone to the
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extreme of holding that Continuous and exclusive possession together with
the appropriation of profits for the statutory period will raise a presumption
of law that there has been an ouster. Thomas v. Garvan, IS N. C. 223.
BAIL-DISCHARGZ

OF SUY-INSANITY

OF PmNxciPAL.-The plaintiffs

in error were sureties on a recognizance for the appearance of a criminal.
The principal did not appear, and upon a proceeding to show cause why
judgment for the penalty should not be rendered against the sureties, they
pleaded the insanity and confinement of the principal in another state. The
state demurred. Held, that insanity was a good excuse for non-performance
of the conditions of the recognizance and released the sureties. Smith et al.
v. People, (Colo., 1919) 184 Pac. 372.
The general rule is that if the condition of the undertaking of special bail
becomes impossible of performance by the act of God, or of the law, or of
the obligee, the bail are thereby discharged.
The reason of the rte is well expressed in the principal case where the
court said, "it is plain that the purpose of a recognizance is nrerely to
insure the presence for trial of a person accused of a bailable offense. The
enriching of the public treasury is no part of the object at which the proceeding is aimed." It is well settled law that the death of the principal will
discharge the bail. Wakefield v. McKinnel, g La. 449; Griffn v. Moore, 2
Ga. 331; Mather v. People, 12 Ill. 9; State v. Cone, 32 Ga. 663; Hayes v.
Carrington, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) i70; Cranberry v. Pool, 14 N. C. 155;
Mount PleasantBank v. Pollock, I Ohio 36. The principal of these cases is
that it has been put out of the power of the surety to exonerate himself. So,
too, in the cases of unavoidable accidents and sickness, it has been held to
excuse sureties for non-appearance. Hargis etc. v. Begley, 129 Ky. 477;
Scully v. Kirkpatrick, 70 Pa. St. 324; People v. Manning, 8 Cowen (N. Y.)
297; Chase v. People, 2 Col. 481. Also the arrest of the principal by military
authorities has been held to excuse the surety, Belding v. State, 25 Ark. 315;
Commonwealth v. Webster, I Bush (Ky.) 616, or where a soldier principal
is in the federal army, and at such a distance as to be unable to get a
furlough. Commonwealth v. Terry, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 383. But where the
principal is in the army, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, within a short
distance of the place, and a furlough could have been obtained, but was not
requested, the sureties are not released. Briggs v. Commonwealth, (Ky.,
1919) 214 S. W. 975. There are also some decisions supporting the principal
case, holding that insanity of the principal, if he is confined in a state asylum,
or is adjudged insane, will excuse. Wood v. Commonwealth, 17 Ky. L. Rep.
io76; Commonwealth v. Fleming, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 491; Fuller v. Davis, I
Gray (Mass.) 612. But in Adler v. State, 35 Ark. 517, it was held that confinement in an insane asylum, in another state, would not discharge the
sureties. However in view of the other acts of God that will discharge the
sureties, there is no good reason on principle, why insanity should not.
BANKRUPTCY-PROVABILiTY or TORT CLAIMs.-By fraudulent representations M was induced to buy certain foreign bills of exchange drawn by a
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firm composed of L. & C. These bills were dishonored at maturity, and the
firm and its members having been declared bankrupts, proof of claim against
each one of the three estates was made by M. The claims against the
individual estates were based primarily upon the fraud. Both the Circuit
Court of Appeals and District Court had affirmed an order of the referee
expunging and disallowing the claims against the individual estates. On
certiorari, held such tort claims not provable under § 63 of the Bankruptcy
Act. Schall v. Camors, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Aps., Jan. 5, 1920.
It was held under our earlier bankruptcy acts that unliquidated claims
arising purely ex delicto were not provable. Dusar v. Murgatroyd, i Wash.
C. C. R. 13 (Act of i8oo); Doggett v. Emerson, i Woodb. & M. 195 (Act of
1841); In re Boston & Fairhaven Iron Works, 23 Fed. 88o (Act of 1867).
It has often been contended that the presence of subdivision b in § 63,
providing for liquidation of unliquidated claims, and the wording of clause
(2)
in § 17, providing, since the amendment of 19o3 for the exception from
discharge of "liabilitics for obtaining pxoperty by false pretenses or false
representations, or for willful and malicious injuries," etc., should lead to
a result different from that reached under the earlier acts. It had, however,
been held that the amended § 17, cl. (2) did not enlarge the class of provable claims. In re United Button Co., x4o Fed. 495, 149 Fed. 48. In re New
York Tunnel Co., 159 Fed. 688. Also that § 63b did not authorize the
liquidation and proof of purely tort claims. In re Southern Steel Co., 183
Fed. 498. In Dunbar v. Dunbar, i9o U. S. 340, the court stated that § 63 b
did not add to the claims provable under § 63 a; but in Crawford v. Burke,
195 U. S. 176, some language was used casting doubt upon this. The decision
in the principal case settles finally the mooted question. The court expressly
lays on one side, as unaffected by the decision the provability of such claims
as were involved in Crawford v. Burke, supra; Tindle v. Birkett, 205 U. S.
534, the torts there being waivable and forming ground for liability quasi ex
contractu on the basis of unjust enrichment.
Co moN CAR RixS--Acc&PTANcr OF GOODS BY CARRIER-BIL, or LADING.-

Plaintiff delivered for shipment a carload of cotton upon a siding and received from defendant's agent the uniform bill of lading containing the following provision: "Property destined to or taken from a station * * * at
which there is no regularly appointed agent shall be entirely at the risk of
the owner after unloaded from cars, * * * and when received from or delivered on private or other sidings, * * * shall be at owner's risk until the
cars are attached to and after they are detached from train." Upon destruction of the car and contents by fire while still on the siding, the plaintiff
brings this action for the value of the cotton. Held, the goods had been
accepted by defendant and it was liable as a common carrier for the loss.
Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. R. Co. v. Nichols & Co., (Miss., igIg), 83 So. 5.
The liability of the railroad as a common carrier begins when the goods
have been delivered to the carrier ready for immediate shipment. That the
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carrier may not be ready to begin the carriage at once is no concern of the
shipper and cannot affect the liability of the carrier. When such delivery is
complete is often a nice question. Railway Co. v. Murphy, 6o Ark. 333. The
issuance of a bill of lading is prima facie evidence of d5livery to the carrier
of the goods specified therein. O'Brien v. Gilchrist,34 Me. 554; Sonia Cotton
Oil Co. v. Steamer Red River, xo6 La. 42; Morganton Mfg. Co. v. Ohio
River, etc. R. R. Co., 121 N. C. 514; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Wilson, u19
Ind. 352. The defendant contended, however, that the presumption was rebutted by the provision quoted, which provision, it was maintained, constituted a valid limitation of liability. More specifically, that the phrase, "at
which there is no regularly appointed agent," qualified only the first clause,
and that therefore the second clause was applicable to this case even though
there was a regularly appointed agent at the station where the cotton was
received. But it is a well-settled rule of construction that a contract restricting the carrier's liability will be construed strictly against the carrier. N. J.
Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 6 How. 344; Hart v. Penna.R. R.
Co., 112 U. S. 331; Hooper v. Wells Fargo Ex. Co, 27 Cal. ii. And in the
instant case, in accordance with the above principlds, the reasonable construction is that given by the supreme courts of California and West Virginia in construing this same provision, and followed in this case by the
Mississippi court; namely, that the paragraph should be construed as a whole,
and the phrase, "at which there is no regularly appointed agent," should be
held to qualify the last clause as well as the first. See Jollv v. A. 7'. & S.
P. R. R. Co., 21 Cal. App. 368; McClure v. N. & W. R. R. Co., o8 S. E. Rep.
(W. Va.) 5s4. Such is undoubtedly a fair interpretation of the words of
the provision, for, as the court points out, to give effect to the defendant's
contention w,,uld be to allow the carrier to discharge itself from its common
law duties by simply sidetracking cars containing goods before the consignee had the opportunity to take charge of them or even knew of their
arrival; or, on the other hand, to refuse to accept liability for the safety of
goods after the shipper had parted with and the carrier had assumed control
over'them. To date, only the courts of the three states mentioned have had
occasion to pass on this particular provision, but, in consideration of the
country-wide use of the uniform bill of lading, it is to be expected that the
same question will arise, in other jurisdictions.
CoNsTrrtONAT LAw- DLoaATIOzN or LEGISLATIVE POWn- CONTROL
Musuns iN ITcuous Disasts.-A Kansas Statute, (Chap. 205, Laws
1917), passed with a view to protection of the public health and control of
communicable diseases, conferred power on state board of health to designate
such diseases as were infectuous, etc., and to prescribe rules and regulations
for the isolation of persons affected with such, and provided a penalty fof
violation of same. These rules, promulgated accordingly, included certain
venereal diseases in the above class. Provision was made: for the isolation
of such cases at a state quarantine camp. Local health authorities were
authorized to examine suspected persons and to isolate persons affected
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when considered necessary, which isolation might be at the camp mentioned
above. Under these rules and an ordinance of the city of Topeka, passed
in pursuance thereof, petitioner was detained as being a person so affected
and an order was issued for his isolation. Application was made for writ of
habeas corpus,-assailing the constitutionality of the above statute as an
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, and the validity of the rules
and the ordinance enacted thereunder. Held: Statute valid and the rules
and ordinance not unreasonable. Ex porte McGee et al, (Kan., i9ig) 185
Pac. 14.
It is true, of course, as a general proposition that legislative power
cannot be delegated. CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, (7th Ed.) p.
163. This proposition is so generally recognized as to require no further
citation of authority. But it is also well recognized that the legislature may
enact a law in general terms and confer on an officer or administrative body
power to enforce the law, and, in order to accomplish that end, to adopt
necessary rules and regulations, and may prescribe penalties for violation of
the rules so adopted. This principle recognized in U. S. v. Penn. Co., 235
red. 961; U. S. v. Grinaud,220 U. S. So6; Isenhour v. State, 157 Ind. 517;
and numerous other cases. As stated in the second case cited: "but, confining themselves within the field covered by the statute they could adopt
regulations of the nature that they had been generally authorized to make, in
order to administer the law and carry the statute into effect." It is unquestioned that administrative details may be left to such officers or board; the
difficulty, of course, is in distinguishing between this and* the delegation of a
power really legislative in each case as it arises. So here it would not
seem really to be a delegation of legislative power but to relate merely to a
procedure for the uniform ascertainment of the subjects on which the law
should operate,--a more scientific ascertainment than the legislature could
well make being desirable,-and to be, therefore, a determination of details
really administrative, as the court here considered it. As a question of practice it would certainly seem that the public welfare could be better promoted by such a method. As stated by the court in the present case, had
the legislature here attempted to specify all such diseases it would have,
at this time, have omitted from its classification the deadly influenza which
soon after followed. The rules of such a subordinate board would be sufficiently elastic to adjust themselves to such an emergency. In the following
cases there was held not to be a delegation of legislative power: Isenhour
v. State, cited supra, authorizing board of health to adopt measures deemed
necessary in connection with pure food laws, to define adulterations, fix
standards, etc.; Carstens v. Desellem, 82 Wash. 643, authorizing commissioner of horticulture to specify what diseases and pests were injurious to
nursery stock, trees, etc., so as to require dis:nfection or destruction. In this
latter case it was said: "to meet the necessities caused by new diseases as
they may occur, and prevent their spread, matters purely administrative may
be left to administrative officers. If this were not so the lives and property
of the people might frequently be placed in jeopardy by the occurrence of
some new contagion which the law-making branch of the government had
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not forseen." Hurst v. Warner, 1o2 Mich. 238, authorizing state board of
health to make rules regarding inspection and disinfection of baggage coming from localities where contagious diseases were shown, to the satisfaction
of the board, to exist. In Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co., 144 Mass. 523
under a statute authorizing boards of health to make regulations for public
health, etc., and respecting articles capable of conveying infection or contagion, board in question was allowed to make and enforce a regulation
requiring all rags arriving from a foreign port to be disinfected. It was
stated: "quarantine laws are a familiar exercise of the police power of a
state-and the making of regulations for their enforcement has always
been entrusted to subordinate boards." In Jacobson v. Mass., x97 U. S.
ii, a Massachusetts statute was upheld which vested authority in local
boards of health to enforce compulsory vaccination when, in their, discretion,
such was deemed necessary. The principle involved in the case-at-hand is
by no means new, but it may be of interest in regard to the rather novel facts
to which it is applied. This case, it seems, is only one of many, at the present time, indicating a tendency to allow more*latitude in the delegation of
discretionary powers.
Dmzs-D m-2.--Grantee appeals from the decree of the lower court
setting aside a deed as not having been validly delivered. Grantor deposited
deed with third person to be delivered to the grantee in the event that the
grantee survived the grantor. Held, title did not pass, for a deposit of a
deed to be delivered to grantee upon grantor's death must be unconditional
and independent of any contingency in order to be valid. Weber v. Brak,
(III., i919, 324 N. E. 654.
In Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 446, the court referring to deposits of deeds
to be delivered on grantee's death said, "The essential requisite to the validity of a deed transferred under circumstances as indicated in this case is
that when it'is placed in the hands of the third party it has passed beyond
the control of the grantor for all time." Apparently the reason for the rule
is that if the grantor retains the power to recall the deposit it is regarded
as testamentary being ambulatory until the grantor's death and thus can only
be effected by an instrument in writing in conformity with the statute for
the disposition of real estate by will. Linn v. Linn, 261 Ill. 6o6; Bogan v.
Sweringen, ig Ill. 454. See 17 MIC. "L.REv. 413. The reason for the rule
does not apply, it would seem, to the facts of the principal case where it
should be noted that the contingency upon the happening of which the
grantor is to regain control is wholly outside the control of the grantor.
The doctrine that the delivery must divest the grantor of his power to control
for all time has never been applied to the case of a delivery in escrow
although the reason is equally applicable. That a delivery in escrow, where
not only the grantor parts with his legal power to control the deed but the
grantee acquires the legal power to control is sufficient, is universally conceded. Wheelright v. Wheelright, 2 Mass. Rep. 447. It is equally well
settled according to the overwhe!ming weight of authority that a deposit
with a third person where the grantor retains the right to repent is not a
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valid delivery for neither the grantor has relinquished his right to control
the deed, nor has the grantee acquired control Stevens v. Stevens, 256 I1.
Ia. 334, contra.
140; Wortz v. Wortz, x28 Minn. 251. Newton v. Bealer, 41
It would seem that the facts of the principal case where the contingency is
wholly outside the control of the grantor has a closer logical relationship
the
to a delivery in escrow than to the case where the grantor reserves
devalid
a
been
has
there
whether
of
criterion
power to recall; that the
livery should be whether the grantor has relinquished control and not whether
the grantee has gained control. In Ruggles v. Lawson, 13 Johns. (N. Y.)
285 the court decided a deposit by a grantor fatally sick, delivery conditional
is
upon his failure to execute a will before death, was a valid delivery. It
the
with
harmonious
not
though
decision,
York
New
the
that
submitted
present authorities, is more logical and better calculated to carry out the
intent of the parties. In the principal case the court conceding that delivery
is merely a question of determining the intent of the grantor, denies that a
conditional delivery unless in escrow is sufficient to show such an intention.
DoMIcIL--CHANG.-Plaintiff owned two residences in Massachusetts,
his principal business interests being there, having habitually spent the whole
year in Massachusetts. Plaintiff also owned an interest in a residence in
Newport, R. I., to which he notified the taxing authorities of both states that
he had removed, and he voted and was taxed there, and did other acts
showing the strongest desire to be considered domiciled in Newport. He and
his family actually spent a few weeks each year in Newport. The tax commissioner of Massachusetts having assessed taxes on plaintiff, he brought
a bill in equity to restrain the collection of the same. Held, that the plaintiff
had not changed his domicile from Massachusetts. Agassii v. Trefry, (D. C.,
Mass., 1919) 26o Fed. 226.
In view of the modem shifting and intricate states of business and family
life, which are being ever more often severed by state lines, where one person
may have residences in several places, the question of domicile often necessarily assumes a perplexity quite unknown in former days of simple living
and business arrangements. In the principal case there was actual physical
presence in the new domicile, plus desire to be considered as having changed
domicile to Newport. However, the court-seems to draw a distinction between desire and intent, making "desire" a part of intent, requiring for "intent" "desire" plus a bona fide reasonable basis therefor. And the holding
of the court in this case in effect means that the court failed to find bona fide
intent to change domicile. The court in the principal case supports itself
by Mitchell v. U. S., 21 Wall. 350; Gilnmn v. Gilinan, 52 Me. 165; In re
Sedgwick, 223 Fed. 655. Contra, Barron v. Boston, 187 Mass. x68. And it
would seem both consistent with the law of domicile, and of value in aiding
a state to collect taxes fairly due it, to determine as matter of legal conclusion,
either as was done above, that there was in fact not the requisite "residence,"
or, approaching from the other side, that there was no bona fide intent to
make that place the principal home. See further, Lowry v. Bradley, r Speer's
Eq. (S. C.) x; Del. Co. v. Petrowsky, 250 Fed. 554.
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DoMICLX--CHANGZ--INT4NT--Wher* complainant's domicile of origin
was Newport, R. I., where she and her ancestors had lived for more than
two generations, where she owned a house and had always claimed her
residence, and where she and her husband paid personal taxes and her
husband was buried and his will probated, the fact that she also acquired
residences in New Hampshire and Massachusetts in each of which she lived
portions of the year, remainder of the time in Newport, even though six
months of the time in Massachusetts: Held, not sufficient to establish a
change of domicile to Massachusetts. Dunn v. Trefry, (C. C. A., ist Circ.,
1919) 26o Fed. 147.
It is universally agreed that a change of domicile requires both the act
or fact of transfer of bodily presence from the old place of abode to the new,
and the concurring intention to abandon the old domicile and gain the new
one. For strong cases where the intent alone was insufficient, see Casey's
Case, i Ashmead 126; Penfield v. Chesapeake R. R. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 494For strong cases where long and continuous actual residence failed to accomplish a change of domicile, see Collier v. Rivaz, 2 Curt. Eccl. 855; Dupuy
v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556. In the principal case, on the facts above stated, plus
other facts showing contingent intent to reside in Massachusetts, Anderson,
J., in the lower court, found that complainant was domiciled in Boston, because he thought for all legal purposes this remote contingency was unimportant. The reviewing court, finding facilities for residence in Rhode
Island, found the contingency obscured the clear intent necessary to change
domicile, and declined to find the requisite intent to change domicile. Of these
two different conceptions of the facts necessary to base an inference of
intent, that of the Circuit Court of Appeals seems most clearly in harmony
with the classic idea of intent-intent to abandon the old domicile with concurrent intent to gain a new domicile, because as long as there is doubt in
one's mind as to giving up old domicile completely, the old legal idea of
intent is not fulfilled. See further, Gilman v. Gilman, 83 Am. Dec. 502;
JAco~s, LAW oF DomicILE, Sec. 125, 126; 23 HAnv. L. REV. 211; 9 HARv. L.
REv. 544.

FALsE STATEMENTS--ZSULTING NERvous SHocic-LIABILITY Von.-In an
action on the case for damages for illness resulting from a nervous shock
induced by false words and threats on the part of the defendant. Held, that
the defendant was liable. Janvier v. Sweeney, [1919] 2 K. B. 316.
Awarding damages for bodily harm resulting from a nervous shock
brought about by spoken words is comparatively novel and but few cases
have been decided on the point. The decision in the principal case was based
almost entirely on Wilkinson v. Downton [897 2 Q. B. 57, where the
defendant, as a practical joke, informed the plaintiff that the latter's husband
had met with a serious accident. Severe illness resulted from the shock
and the plaintiff was permitted to recover. Wright, J., in deciding the case,
made the statement, "it must be admitted that the present case is without
precedent." Several intervening cases, notably Dulieu v. White and Son's,
[i9oi] 2 IC B. 669, approved Wilkinson v. Dowuton, supra,but none of these

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
involved injury as the result of spoken words, being cases where the mental
shock was catised by negligent acts. Allsop v. Alsop, 5 H. and N. 534, involved injury resulting from spoken words and did not allow a recovery.
This was considered, both in the principal case and its predecessor, but was
distinguished on the ground that it was an action for slander and the words
were not spoken in the presence of the plaintiff. The cause of action in both
Janvier v. Sweeney, supra, and Wilkinson v. Downton, supra, seems fairly
obvious. The defendant has wilfully done an act reasonably calculated to
cause physical harm to the plaintiff, and physical harm has in fact resulted.
In neither case was there justification alleged for the act. The difficulty in
both of these cases, however, is not-whether such an injury is actionable
when it results from words alone, but whether there can be any recovery
for physical injury which is the result of fright and not of physical impact.
The same question is involved where the injury is caused by negligence
through the intermediary of fright. The opposition to permitting recoveries
in such cases arose largely from the fact that courts failed to distinguish
between fright as a consequence and fright as a link in a chain of causation.
Fright, unaccompanied by physical injury, has never been recognized as a
basis for recovery, and influenced principally by this fact the English Privy
Council, in the Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cases
=, established the doctrine that no recovery should be 'allowed where
physical injury has resulted from nervous shock on the following grounds:
ist, that the damage was too remote, since it was the result of the fright,
not of the negligent act; 2d, that a contrary decision would be against public
policy, since it would afford a wide range ot opportunity for imaginary
claims. The doctrine has been followed in Mass., N. Y., Ill., and several
other states. See Spade v. Lynn and Boston R. Co., 168 Mass. 285; Mitchell
v. Rochester R. Co., i51 N. Y. xo7; Brown v. Craven, 175 I1. 4o1. The
ground upon which greatest stress has been laid in these cases is that of
public policy. The ground of remoteness of cause has also been recognized
and maintained, however, the view of the courts apparently having been that
fright accompanied by physical injury, however severe, is only aggravated
fright and cannot be recognized as a basis for recovery. Victorian Railways
Commissioners v. Coultas, supra, the basis for these minority holdings, has
been disapproved in-Bell v. Great Northern Railway Co. of Ireland, 26 L. L
Tr. 428; Wilkinson v. Downton, supra; Dulieu v. White and Sons. supra:
and is said to be no longer good law in Coyle v. Watson, Ld., [9o5] A. C. i.
The modern and more logical rule as stated in Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry.
Co.. 48 Minn. x34, and Dulieu v. White and Sons, supra, is that where physical
injury results from negligence the fact that a mental condition or operation
intervenes between the negligence and the injury does not break the required
sequence of causes. These courts were not misled by the fact that a state of
mind is in itself not a tangible cause of action. The physical injury, and not
the fright itself, is the basis of the action. Dulien v. White and Sons, supra,
also disapproved the most cherished ground of the minority doctrine, public
policy, recognizing that such a doctrine would result in the denial of redress
in many meritorious cases. Since the injury itself is easily determinable,
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and also its exact connection with the wrongful or negligent act, it is difficult to see why the much-feared opportunity for imaginary claims should
arise. The policy of the law most certainly should not be directed toward
discouraging just litigation. The October number of the LAW Q. REv. (iC19)
p. 287 declares that the principal case has finally established the majority
doctrine. See also 41 AM. LAW RIZ. (N. S.) 141 and i HARV. L. Rlv. 304.
An interesting speculation is raised by considering the results had the statements made by the defendants, both in the principal case and in Wilkinson
v. Downton, supra, been true. The action in both is confessedly based upon
the injury and not upon the falsity of the statement. If such a doctrine is
carried to its logical extremity, it is difficult to see how the same decisions
could have been avoided had the statements been true. Such a result is
manifestly reductio ad absurdum. It is submitted that the court should in
some way base its decision at least in part upon the falsity.
HUSBAND

AND

WIFE-WIFE'S

ASSENT Or HUSBAND.-A

CONTRACT TO CONVEY

WITHOUT WRITTEN

wife, without the written consent of her husband

required by statute, deeded land to a grantee, who immediately executed
notes for the purchase money secured by a mortgage back on the land. After
the death of her husband the wife advertised the land for sale under the
mortgage but when the grantee tendered the full amount due she called off
the sale and sued in ejectment for the land. Held, (two Justices dissenting)
the grantee was entitled to a decree for specific performance, the wife's deed
having been good as a contract to convey. Sills v. Bethea, (N. C., I9ig)
o S. E. 593.
That this deed by the wife was in no sense a conveyance of title, as it
was void and as the grantee immediately gave back a mortgage on the land,
can be readily seen. Bunting v. Jones, 78 N. C. 242; Council v. Pridgen, 153
N. C 443, 69 S. E. 4o4. But holding the instrument to be a contract to
convey, capable of specific-performance, seems doubtful upon principle. The
decisions of North Carolina seem to hold conclusively that any instrument
executed by a married woman purporting to transfer title to her real estate,
unless her husband joins or his written consent is obtained, is absolutely
void. Ball v. Pacquin, i4o N. C. 83, 52 S. E. 410, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 307;
Bank v. Benbow, (N. C.) 64 S. E. 491; Council v. Pridgen, supra. However
the same court has held that the contract of a married woman, which does
not purport to transfer any title to her land, is valid and an action for damages for breach thereof may be sustained against her, although such contract
is not capable of specific performance, as her husband's written consent could
not he compblled. Warren v. Dail, 17o N. C. 4o6; 14 MICH. L. RFv. 423. If
her instrument purporting to convey title is an absolute nullity it is hard to
see how it can be ratified. Being void in its inception it is incapable of
ratification. Likewise the case seems equally unjustifiable when considered
in the light of the doctrine of equitable estonpel. since the defendant has not
been led to act to his detriment by the fraudulent renresentations of the
plaintiff. See Miller-Yones Furniture Co. v. Port Smith Ice and Coal Co.,
66 Ark. 287, 50 S. W. 5o8; Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Nebr. 51, 77 N. W. 365,
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73 Am. St. Rep. 401; Richardson v. Oliver, io.s Fed. 277. 44 C. C. A. 468,
53 L. R. A. x3; Patello v. Lytle, x58 N. C. 95, 73 S. E. 2oo. There must be
reliance thereupon to one's substantial prejudice. BGEIow, EsToprzr, 4925o2. Since a mere parol promise by the wife could not ratify (if such is possible) the deed, as such promise would be ineffective by the statute of
frauds, Price v. Hart, 29 Mo. 171, and since there has been no formal ratification and no conduct of the plaintiff to the prejudice of the defendant, it is
indeed hard to see how the case can be supported.
INJuNcTrioN---DuLmY -Rgus.-Defendant
had debauched plaintiff's
minor daughter and had induced her to leave her parental abode and live
with him in a state of adultery. This state of things continuing it was held
that equity will afford the father of the girl a remedy by injunction, and to
that end restrain defendant from associating with her and from communicating with her in any manner or through the agency of any other person.
Stark v. Hamilton (Ga., 1919), 99 S. E. 861.
While the court states that the case involves both personal and property
rights (right to services of minor child), it rests its decision on a violation
of the rights of personality. Says the court, "It is difficult to understand
why injunctive protection of a mere property right should be placed above
similar protection from the continual humiliation of the father and the
reputation of the family. In some instances the former may be adequately
compensated in damages, but the latter is irreparable." In view of the
difficulty of making the decree effective, it might be doubted whether it was
expedient to grant the relief, but all must welcome the case as another step
in the progress of equity over the arbitrary limitations imposed by some
of the older authorities. Vor a learned and exhaustive discussion of the
problem, see Dean Pound's article on Equitable Relief Against Defamation
and Injuries to Personality in 29 HARv. L. REv. 640.
INsuRANca-DATE OF CONDEMNED CRIMINAL-INCONTFSTABLE PoLIcY.The insured was convicted of murder and sentenced to be hanged. He
escaped and feloniously assaulted the officers who were attempting to recapture him. The officers killed him in self defense. Held, this was not a risk
covered by the policy of life insurance, the presence of an "incontestable"
clause not having been brought out at the trial. United Order of the Golden
Cross v. Overton, (Ala., igig) 83 So. 59.
Where the policy contains no "incontestable" clause, execution of the
insured for crime avoids the insurance contract. Amicable Society v. Bolland, 2 Dow. & Cl. I; Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. McCue,
223 U. S. 234; Supreme Commandery v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436. Where the
policy is by its terms incontestable after a certain time except for non-payment of premiums, there is a clear split in authority. On the ground of
public policy such clauses have been declared inoperative where the death
results from the crime of the insured. Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co..
x87. U. S. 362, (execution for felony); Collins v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 27
Pa. Sup. Ct. 353, (same). Courts which hold contra also base their decis-
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ions on the ground of public policy. Mutual Life Ins. Co.'v. Lovejoy, (Ala.,
1917) 78 So. 299, (suicide of insured) ; Sun Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, Io8 Ky.
4o8, (death due to wrongful act of insured); Holdorn v. United lVorkmnen,
61g, (insured killed by insane beneficiary); Collins v. Metro. Life
159 Ill.
ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37, (insured executed for crime). The latter case involved
the identical policy litigated in the Pennsylvania case supra, and the reasoning of the court is striking. "If a man whc" is executed for a crime has at
his death $iooo in real estate, $I,ooo in chattels, and $S,ooo life insurance
payable to his estate, his real estate descends to his heirs and his personal
chattels to his administrator, but the $i,ooo life insurance must be left in
the hands of the company who has received the premiums because it is said
to be contrary to public policy to require the company to pay, lest by so
doing it lend encouragement to other policy holders to seek murder, and
execution therefor, in order that their estates or heirs might profit thereby."
See also (execution of insured) 6 MxcH. L. REv. 489, 22 YALE L. J. 158, 292;
(incontestable policy) 82 CENT. L. J. 386; 17 VA. L. REG. I; Ann. Cas. 1917
D 1183; L. R. A. 1918 A 898.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-HOLDING OVER-TENANCY FROM YEAR TO YEAR-

DATE OF COMMENcEMENT-NOTICE TO QuiT.-By an agreement plaintiff let
premises to defendant from November ii, x195, to December 25, 19x6, at
yearly rent payable in quarterly installments. The defendant held over without any further agreement so that by plaintiff's acceptance of the quarter's
rent on March 25, 19x7, defendant was recognized as tenant from year to
year. On June 8, 1917, defendant gave notice that he would quit the premises
on December 25, 1917. Plaintiff contended that since the original entry was
on November xi, the tenancy could be terminated only on November Ix of
some year, and hence the notice on June 8 was ineffective because not six
months prior to November ii. Held, that this year to year tenancy was a
new tenancy commencing December 25, x9x6 and determinable on any subsequent Christmas Day by giving six months notice. Croft v. Blay, (91g)

88 L. J. (Ch.) 545.

The principal case is an affirmance of the conclusion of Astbury, J., noted,
ante, p. 64. This decision should clear up a matter regarding which there
has been confusion since the publication of CoLE ON EJECrMENT, in 1857.
This book contained a statement, relied upon by the losing party in the
principal case, which Warrington, L. J., refers to as the fons et origo mali.
LIBEL-FALSE STATEMENT AS TO RECORD OF JUDGMENT-INJURY TO CREDIT-

.INNuENDo-The defendants erroneously published in their gazette that a
decree in absence had been taken against the plaintiff in a small debts court.
The plaintiff in action for libel alleges that the publication "falsely represented that he was given to or had begun to refuse or delay to make payment
of his debts and that he was a person to whom credit should not be given."
Held, the publication warranted the innuendo and the defendants were not
the
protected by a headnote to the effect that "in no case does publication of
more
anything
or
named
anyone
of
part
the
decree imply inability to pay on
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than the fact that the entry published appeared in the Court Record:

'

Stubbs

Lira. v. Mazure, (i919) 88 L. J. (P. C.) i35.

In a former case Stubbs Lir. v..Russell, (91'3) 82 L. J. (P. C.) 98, in
which the facts were similar but in which the innuendo alleged was that the
plaintiff "was unable to pay his debts and was in insolvent circumstances and
in pecuniary embarrassment and was evading payment of a just .debt" it was
held the innuendo imported into the publication more than it could reasonably
bear: that the whole of the statement in the headnote must be read in
conjunction with the alleged excerpt from the Sheriff Court books and when
it is so read it is impossible that any reasonable man should collect from it
the libelous imputation alleged. Lord Shaw in this case however pointed
out that although the meaning that the plaintiff could not pay because of
insolvency was negatived by the headnote, nevertheless if he had alleged the
meaning of the publication to be that he would not pay because of improper
motives he might have recovered as such meaning was not affected by the
headnote. Apparently the innuendo in the principal'case was drawn so as
to show damage within the meaning suggested by Lord Shaw. Lord Wren-.
bury, in his dissenting opinion, disapproved of the doctrine that a publisher
of a false statement could in a headnote restrict the sense in which it might be
understood (though he might restrict the -meaning of a true statement);
saying, "I should have thought the question was what the reader might or
could reasonably imply from the alleged facts even if the writer told him that
he (the writer) did not imply, and did not invite the reader to imply -anything discreditable." It does not seem, however, that either case stands for
more in this respect than that the attempt to restrict the meaning in which a
false or true statement might be understood, should be considered with the
rest in determining the resultant meaning conveyed. A heading prefixed to
a paragraph will be read with the rest of it and the whole taken in the
ordinary meaning of the words. Harvey v. French, 2 Tyr. 585 (1832). And
though one part of a statement taken alone is injurious to a man's character,
if the jury think that the effect of that part is removed by the other part of
the statement it is not a libel. Chalmers v. Payne, 5 Tyr. 766 (i835). The
question of privilege was not raised by the defendants who no doubt considered the law as settled on that point by'Fleming v. Newton, I H. L. Cas.
363, McNally v. Oldham, 16 Ir. C. L. Rep. 298, and Williams v. Smith, 58 L.
J. Q. B. 21 which held that a bare publication of a record of judgments recorded and registered as a matter of legal or public interest is privileged;
still if the intention be to show that the judgments are unsatisfied at the
time of publication and to warn creditors, the publication is not an ordinary
report of what has taken place in Public Courts and is not privileged.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-PLACING WHITE PERSON IN COLORED WAa.-Plaintiff's daughter, a white person, having been adjudged insane, was committed
she
to the asylum operated by the defendants for treatment. Soon afterward
some
for
kept
there
and
patients
was placed in a ward set apart for negro
months; also word "colored" was entered after her name on the records
Under
of the institution. Action for damagqs for alleged libel. Held:
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the Oklahoma statute the acts complained oi cannot sustain this action.
Collins v. Okl. State Hosp. (Okla., pxgg) 184 Pac. 945.
The real question here was whether the act of placing and keeping this
woman in the negro ward could constitute a libel, for, as regarded the placing
of the word "colored" after her name in the records, there was no evidence
of same having come to the knowledge of any third person-no publication.
It may be noted that this court decided, however, that to write of a white
.person that he was colored was libelous per se; see also on this point: Flood
v. News Courier Co., 71 S. C. 112; Upton v. Times Dem. Co., 104 La. 141.
The section of the Oklahoma laws in question is partially as follows: "Libel
is a false or malicious unprivileged publicatidn by writing, printing, picture
or effigy or other fixed representation to the eye which exposes any person
to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which tends to deprive
him of public confidence, etc." By the rule of construction known as
"ejusdem generis" the court held that the general term "or other fixed
representation" only referred to things of the same kind or class enumerated
by the particular words preceding- "writing, printing, picture or effigy,"
and that the acts in question here could not be included in this classification.
A rather novel question is presented by the plaintiff's contention in this case.
Probably, in view of the statute in this case, the decisioh is sound (though
the interpretation seems rather technical); but, from a broader point of
view, and in the absence of statutory provisions, it would seem that such a
cofitention might well be made-that these acts might constitute a libel, a
holding out to the world that this woman was a negro. Of course, the ordinary means of publishing a libel is by writing, etc., but, after all, it is the
seeing by others of something defamatory to the party in question which is
the gist of the offense, and this element is certainly present here. Libel is
defined in NpwELL, SLTANIM AND LmEL, (3rd Ed.) p. 32, as "defamation published by means of writing, printing, pictures, images or anything that is the
object of sight." Libel may be by effigy: Johnson v. Com., io Sad. (Pa.)
514; in this case it is said: "no words whatever are essential to the constitution of the offense of libel;" also Lortie v. Claude, Queb. Off. Rep. 2
(S. C.) 369; and it is generally recognized that a picture may c6nstitute a
libel. From such it may be observed that the essence of the offense does
not, of necessity, embody any writing, but would seem to consist in some
impression being conveyed to the eye. While no case on facts really similar
to the present has been found, it is at least worthy of consideration whether
such case may not be brought within this principle.
MANDAMUS-DUTY or HIGH SCHOOL 'TO IssuE DIPLOMA.-A high school
student who had satisfactorily completed the prescribed course of study,
refused to wear a cap and gown at the graduating exercises on the ground
that they were nauseating from fumigation and were apt to carry disease.
The school authorities refused to issue her a diploma. Held, entitled to a
writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of a diploma. It is not the
graduating exercises but the completion of the course of study which entitle,
the student to a diploma. An implied legal duty rests on the public officers
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of such school to issue a diploma to one who has finished such course of
study. Valentine v. Independent School District of Casey, (Iowa, 1919),
174 N. W. 334.

The authorities on this question are meagre. A "graduate" has been defined- as one who has honorably passed the prescribed course of study and
has received a certificate to that effect. Leopold v. United States, 18 Ct. of
Claims 46. The diploma is only evidence that the course has been completed
and that the student is otherwise qualified according to the rules of the
school. Sweitzer v. Fisher, 172 Ia. 266. According to the principal case a
rule that the student participate in the graduation ceremony, at least in the
dress prescribed, is not a reasonable requirement for graduation. But it is
conceivable that where such a ceremonial is in the nature of a public test
or demonstration of the student's knowledge and general fitness for graduation. participation therein may be as proper a requirement for a diploma
as compliance with the rules of attendance, deportment, scholarship, etc.
The point does not seem to have been decided. That a degree may be more
than a certificate of attendance is shown in the case of People ex. rel.
O'Sullivan v. N. Y. Law School, 68 Hun (N. Y.) ix8, where the student had
passed his final examinations but was refused a degree because of disgraceful
conduct before the day of graduation. He was however given a certificate
all
to the effect that he had completed the required course. The question in
the
these cases is whether the act which is sought to be enforced involves
not lie.
exercise of discretion or judgment, in which case mandamus will
in the
that
clear
seem
would
It
225.
S.)
(U.
How.
17
U. S. v. Seaman,
case under discussion the court is right in deciding that there was no
that
further discretion or judgment to be exercised by the school board, and
the rule that the student appear at the graduation ceremony in a particular
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costume was too arbitrary and unreasonable to be recognized. But if
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Orange Training School, 63 N. J. L. 528. The cases are in conflict as to
whether the duty, performance of which is sought, must be expressly enexpress or
joined by statute. By the weight of authority it may be either
of
collection
For
520.
Tex.
90
State,
v.
Co.
RR.
implied. San Antonio St.
cases see 26 CYc. 360. In the following cases a writ of mandamus was
granted though it did not appear that the duty was imposed expressly by
law: state superintendent refused to sign diploma of industrial school grad.
uate who had completed all the requirements. Hamlett v. Reid, 65 Ky. 613;
school board refused to issue certificate to teacher who had passed the
examination with the required standing. Northington v. Sublette, 114 Ky.
certificate to one
75; school board refused to issue grammar grade teacher's
Hewitt, iog Cal.
v.
Keller
examination.
the
passed
who had satisfactorily
148. In view of this state of the authorities the decision in the principal
case seems to be sound.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
MARRIAGE-SUIT TO ANNUL-ALImONY

IN

SUIT BY THIRD PARTIES-A

testator devised his property in trust for the support of his son during his
life, and upon the son's death, to pay and distribute what remained to and
among his heirs at law and next of kin as prescribed by law in case of
intestacy. After testator's death the son married defendant, by whom he
had issue one son. After the death of defendant's husband, plaintiffs, collateral heirs of testator, brought action to annul the marriage on the ground
of lunacy of testator's son at the time of the marriage. On motion by
defendant for alimony and counsel fee, held-alimony and counsel fee 4an
only be allowed when the relation of husband and wife exists. The obligation
to support and maintain is the underlying principle which justifies the granting of alimony and counsel fee when the marriage relation is attacked.
Plaintiffs are strangers to defendant and owe her no duty of support. "She
is not a privileged suitor against them, but only against her husband while
he lived. Farnharn v. Farnham, (N. Y., igig), 124 N. E. 894.
Such a case as this seldom arises for the reason that suits to annul marriages may be brought by others than a party to the relation only in a few
exceptional cases. However, there are two decisions in accord with the pres.ent one, Stivers v. Wise, 46 N. Y. S. 9, and Erwin v. Erwin, 12o Ark. 581, in
both of which counsel fees and alimony were disallowed the wife in a suit
for annulment brought against her by the husband's guardian. In the
present case Pound, J., dissenting, distinguishes between alimony and counsel
fees and holds that the latter should be allowed. He says, "On general principles of equity, the court should have power to require those who seek to
annul a marriage for their pecuniary gain to pay such sums as may be
necessary to enable the wife to conduct her defense * * * The fact that he
(the husband] is dead does not make the claim for counsel fee i'equitable."
This, we submit, is sound reasoning. There would seem to be a greater
equity, if anything, in the defense of the marriage relation against collateral
attack, than in a direct action by one of the parties, especially after the
death of the husband. It might be well to note that the basis of the allowance of both alimony and counsel fees is equitable, though it is often defined
by statute. See Webb v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 144 Mich. 674, and Higgins
v. Sharp, 164 N. Y. 4, in which the power of the court to allow alimony and
counsel fee is held to be an incident to the jurisdiction.
NgLIGGNCr-FAILURE To MAx

BRMG

SAYE VOR CHLDRX?----ATTRArVZ

NuIsAwcz."-Defendant city built a bridge over a culvert that distharged
into a small pool; the waters were colored by dyes poured into the stream
by mills above the bridge. The bridge was in a populous part of the city, and
for twenty years children had played on vacant land nearby. Plaintiff's
intestate, a child of 28 months, crawled between the parallel iron pipes that
formed the bridge railing to see the "rushing of the colored waters," and fell
to the base of the culvert and was killed. In an action for damages, hId,
(two judges dissenting) defendant was liable,-as the injury was caused by
its negligence in failing to maintain a railing that would sufficiently protect
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children of the neighborhood attracted to the spot. Corner v. City of Winston-Salem, (N. C., igig) ioo S. E.. 619.
The opinion states that this is not, strictly, a case of "attractive nuisance,"
as the bridge was a structure necessary to the use of the city. However, as
the case decides that the city owed a duty to protect children attracted to
the bridge by curiosity to investigate the cause of "the gurgling of the
many-hued waters," it adopts the reasoning of the "attractive nuisance"
cases, and imposes the peculiar liability laid down in them, as well on
municipalities that maintain public works as on private enterprises whose
premises contain devices dangerous but attractive to children. The general
rule is that the owner or occupier of premises owes no duty to trespassers
further than to refrain from wilful acts of injury. 2 COOLEY, Toars (3d Ed.)
x268 and cases cited. But an exception is sometimes made in the case of
children of tender years, where the owner or occupant of premises maintains
thereon something attractive to childien and also dangerous to them if
meddled with. CooLZy, supra 1269. Similar statements in I THOMPSON,
NZGL-IGNCX (2d Ed.) § 1024; 33 CENT. L. J. 325, note. This exception has
been recognized in a series of decisions known as the "Turn-table Cases," the
leading case being Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, decided in the Supreme
Court in 1873. It has been approved in Minn., Mo., Cal., Ohio, Kan., Tex.,
Ga., S. C., and Neb. i4 L. R. A. 781-783 and cases there 'cited. In many
jurisdictions the doctrine has been extended to cover a diversity of dangerous situations: cog-wheels exposed outside defendant's mill, Whirley v.
Whiternan, I Head. (Tenn.) 61o; unprotected elevator, Mullaney v. Spence,
15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 319; defective gate, Birge v. Gardiner,ig Conn.
507; ponds of water, Brinkley Car Works v. Cooper, 6o Ark. 545; Price v.
Atchison Water Co., 58 Kan. 551, Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141. In the
last case, the court holds it is impossible to distinguish, as to attractiveness,
between turn-tables and ponds of water. See for complete discussion 5 MICH.
L. REV. 357. See also i MICH. L. Rv. 418, 6o5; 4 MICH. L. Rtv. 78; 8 MICH.
L. REv. 688. The doctrine was applied to a water reservoir in the jurisdiction
of the principal case in Selma y. Starling Cotton Mills, 17r N. C. 222. But
recognition of the exception in any but turn-table cases is not by weight of
authority, CooLgY, supra, 1272 and cases there cited. Some jurisdictions
flatly refuse to follow the doctrine of Railroad Co. v. Stout, supra, and hold
that the owner of premises owes no legal duty to trespassers, except to
Tefrain from inflicting wilful injuries, Daniels v. N. Y. and N. E. R. Co.,
54 Mass. 349; D. L. and W. R. Co. v. Reich, 6I N. J. L. 635; Frost v. Eastern R. Co, 64 N. H. 220; Walsh v. Fitchburg R. Co., 145 N. Y. 3o. See also
Dobbins v. M. K. and T. Ry. Co., 91 Tex. 6o. It has been remarked that this
is true "chiefly in those portions of our country which are dominated by
railroad and other corporate influences." THOMPSON, supra, § I040. It is
inferable from the report of the principal case that the bridge from which
the child fell, built in 1917, was different from the one it replaced, in that
the old bridge had solid brick railings which would protect adequately children playirg on it. If this was the fact, the decision is supportable on
slightly different grounds from those given above. A few cases indicate
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that if premises have been used as a playground for children for a long
time, and have been safe for that period, and the owner makes a dangerous
excavation or erection on them, which he leaves unguarded, it would be in
the nature of a trap which would make him liable for injuries caused by it.
26 L. R. A. 687 and cases there cited. Penso v. McCormick, 125 Ind. 116;
Indianapolisv. Emmelman, io8 Ind. 530.
PARENT AND CHILD-DUTY OF FATHER TO SUPPORT NOT ENFORCEABLE IN

EQuITY.-Where a father had abandoned his children, and they had filed a
bill in equity for a decree against him for a monthly maintenance allowance,
to be made a lien upon his property. Held, that there was no authority for
the assumption of equity jurisdiction in such a case, and that it would be
against public policy and family unity to extend its jurisdiction to cover a suit
of a child against its father. There was a strong dissenting opinion. Rawlings v. Rawlings, (Miss., ig9g) 83 So. r46.
By the common law of England-which was followed in a few early
American cases-a father was not legally bound to support his infant child,
and would not be liable for necessaries furnished for the support of the
child. Urmston v. Newcomen, 4 Ad. & El. 899; Mortimer v. Wright, 6 Mees.
& W. 482; Kelley v. Davis. 49 N. H. 187; "Huntv. Thompson, 3 Scam. (Ill.)
179; Gordon v. Potter, 17 Vt. 348. But this doctrine has not been followed
by the majority of American courts. Dunbar v. Dunbar, igo U. S. 340;
Brown v. Brown, 132 Ga. 712; Gilley v. Gilley, 79 Me. 292; and many others.
See 13 MICH. L. Rzv. 345; o R. C. L. 622. However the remedy at law is
very inadequate, since it requires credit to the infant, and generally a suit to
recover for the necessaries. So there is much force in the argument of the
dissenting opinion that such a remedy at law is inadequate for the infant.
Now inadequacy of the remedy at law is a ground for equity jurisdiction,
where there is an existing legal duty. Garland v. Garland, 50 Miss. 694;
Prather v. Prather, 4 Dess. (S. C.) 33; Glover v. Glover, x6 Ala. 44o. -In
these last cited cases, a wife was allowed to recover an allowance for her
support from her husband, without a divorce. Also where the wife has
btought a bill in equity for the maintenance and support of the children, it
has been allowed. Leibold v. Leibold, z58 Ind. 60; De Brauwere v. De Brauwere, 2o3 N. Y. 460, commented on in o MICH. L. REV. 415. In many other
cases equity courts have said that they had full jurisdiction over minors.
Williams v. Duncan, 44 Miss. 375; Johns v. Smith, 56 Miss. 727. Nor has
equity hesitated to make an allowance out of a minor's estate for its maintenance and support, where the father was unable to support the child at all,
or in a station befitting its expectancy. Watts v. Steele, i9 Ala. 656. So
from the above it does not seem that equity would have had much difficulty
in assuming jurisdiction in such a case as the principal one. However the
majority of the court, in the principal case, thought it was against public
policy and family interests, to allow a suit by a minor in equity directly
against its father. And in support of their contention they had the only
authority, directly in point. Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 308.
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PARLIAMENTARY LAW-EXPRESS AUTHORITY NECESSARY FOR THE "CASTING
VoTE"--By statute, the county judge was made the presiding officer of the

county court, which consisted of the justices of the county. The county court,
being authorized to issue bonds for a new court house upon a majority vote
in favor of it, voted eighteen for and eighteen against Vhereupon the
county judge, without any express authority in the statutes, cast a vote in
favor and declared the resolution carried. Bill brought to enjoin the issuance
of the bonds. Held, ihat a presiding officer of a deliberative body does not
have the privilege of the "casting vote," unless expressly authorized, and that
the injunction should be granted. Reeder v. Trotter, (Tenn., ipip) 215 S.
W. 400.
The "casting vote' is usually defined as the vote of the presiding officer of
a deliberative assembly or legislative body, in the event of a tie vote upon
any question or motion. This vote may be the single vote of a person who
never votes at any other time, or it may be the double vote of a person who
first votes with the rest, and then upon an equality, creates a majority by
giving a second vote. Wooster v. Mullins, 64 Conn. 340; People v. Rector etc.
of the Church of Atonement, 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 6o3. The double vote was
allowed in the New York case because the statute expressly gave the vote
to each of the wardens and vestrymen, and also gave express authority to
the presiding officer, who might be one of the wardens, to have the "casting
vote," without taking away his vote as a member. But where the statute
was not explicit on this question, the vote of the mayor as a member of the
council was withheld when acting as the presiding officer with the privilege of
the "casting vote." Brown v. Foster, 88 Me. 49. But in all the above cases
and in many others, the authority to exercise the "casting vote" was express.
Launtz v. People, 113 IIl. 137; Carrol v. Wall, 35 Kan. 36. And such seems
to be the situation in all cases where this point has been raised. However
the principal case is one where no express privilege of voting as a member,
or in case of an equality, was given to the presiding officer. It was held
in an early Alabama case, State v. Adams, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 231, that a sheriff
has no power to exercise the "casting vote," where he was nQt expressly
authorized, and that this power could not be implied. This latter case
directly supports the doctrine of the principal case. Thus the doctrine of
the principal case seems in accord with authority, since the reported cases,
raising this question, are cases based on express authority, and since the
Alabama case is directly in point. See also note 47 L. R. A. 561, and 29
Cyc. i6go.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-LIABILITY OP UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL WHO HAS

mortgagor of a consignment of cotton seed
shipped the cotton seed over plaintiff's road. The plaintiff, pursuant to
custom in dealing with the shipper marked the bill of lading "freight prepaid." In reality it had not been paid. Three years later apon discovering
that the shipper was only the agent, the plaintiff (mortgagor)'sued to collect
the freight charges from defendant, mortgagee. The defendant, in the meantime, thinking the freight had been paid, had settled with the agent. Held,
SETTLED WITH AGENT-The
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defendant not liable. Southern Ry. Co. v. W. A. Simpkins Co. et al. (N. C.,
1gg), 100 S. R. 41&

The court in deciding the case considered the mortgagee both as disclosed and undisclosed principal, reaching the same result by either method.
Concerning the liability of an undisclosed principal there have been many
adjudications. The rule was first laid down in i829 by the case of Thomson
v. Davenport, 9 B. and C. 78, 4 M. and R. 11o. Dictum in that case asserted
that the liability of an undisclosed principal to the third person was subject
to the qualification that the accounts between the agent and principal had not
been altered to the detriment of the principal. Twenty-six years later, Parke,
B., in Heald v. Kenworthy, io Exch. 74o, restricted this rule by holding that
the undisclosed principal was relieved only when he had been induced ta
settle with the agent by the acts of the third party. Armstrong v. Stokes, 7
Q. B. 598 (1872) attempted a refined distinction between Thomson v. Davenport, supra, and Heald v. Kenworthy, supra,but a later English case rejected
such distinction. Irvin v. Watson, 5 Q. B. D. 414, 42 L. T. Rep. N. S. 8o.
The rule as laid down in Heald v. Kenworthy, supra, is now the established
rule in England. See also Davison v. Donaldson, 9 Q. B. D. 623, 47 L. T.
Rep. N. S. 564. That rule has also been followed in this country by some
courts. Hyde v. Wolfe, 4 La. 234, 23 Am. Dec. 484; Brown v. Bankers Tel.
Co., 30 Md. 39. It is approved in 31 Cyc. i58o, being there called the "better
rule." However, the majority of courts in this country seem to adhere to
the rule of Thomson v. Davenport, supra. See Clealand v. Walker, ii Ala.
io58. 46 Am. Dec. 238; Bush v. Devine. q Harr. 37.5; Emerson v. Patch, 123
Mass. 54I; Fradley v. Hyland, 37 Fed. 40, 2 L. R. A. 749; Knapp v. Simon,
96 N. Y. 284; Price-Evans Foundry Co. v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., (Ga.,
1917) 9I S. E. 283. The court also considered the defendant in the light of
a disclosed principal. This seems to be the most satisfactory way of disposing of the case. The chattel mcrtgge having been recorded the plaintiff
was held to have had knowledge of the real ownership of the articles shipped
and consequenfl3y elected to give exclusive credit to the agent. The principal
then could not be held. Such doctrine is supported by abundant authority.
Addison v. Gaudassequi,4 Taut. 374; Homan§ v. Lambard,21 Me. 308; Fdrd
v. Williams, 21 How. (U. S.) 287; Jones v. Aetna Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 501;
Johnson v. Cleaver, 15 N. H. 332; Winchester v. Howard, 97 Mass. 303.
REMPERNDUM-APRVAL OR REJEcTION" or

PZOPOSFD AMENDMENTS TO F0DCONsTiTuTxNo.-The legislature of Arkansas having voted approval of
the proposed Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a
petition signed by the necessary number of voters for a referendum to the
people of the state was filed with the secretary of state. In action to compel
the secretary to certify the referendum, held that the state provision for referendum did not apply to action of the legislature in approving proposed amendments. Whittemore v. Terral, (Ark., 1919) 215 S. W. 686.
This subject is discussed ante, p. 51. The conclusion of the court is based
on the ground that the constitution of Arkansas, providing for a referendum covers only "acts," "measures," and "laws," these terms being used
E.AL
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made of profits but the nature of the business done that is to be considered
in deciding the question of liability to taxation." Congregational Sunday
School & Pub. Soc. v. Board of Review, (IlL, i919), x25 N. E. 7.
The opinion in this case contains a very lucid discussion of this question,
as to which there is little division of authority. There is some variation,
however, in cases where part of a building, owned by a religious or charitable
organization and used principally in the furtherance of its purposes, is rented
for commercial purposes. Though the rents so received be devoted to
charitable or religious uses, the cases cited in the principal case hold that
the building loses its exemption. But in Detroit Young Men's Soc. v.
Mayor, etc., of Detroit, 3 Mich. 172, it is held that the whole building is
exempt under the statute. And in Y. M. C. A. of Omaha v. Douglas County,
6o Neb. 642, the parts used for charitable purposes were exempt, while the
parts rented for business purposes were held subject to tax. Another curious
diversity exists between a church parsonage, which is taxed as not being
used for religious purposes (St. Peter's Church v. Scott County, 12 Minn.
395), and dwelling houses erected by a college on its lands for residences
of its president and instructors, -which buildings are ordinarily held exempt
from taxation (Harvard College v. Cambridge Assessors, 175 Mass. 145.)
The difference in holdings may usually be traced to differences in wording
of the exemption statutes, which are always strictly construed. The underlying basis of constitutional and statutory exemption of the -property of religious and charitable organizations is that such institutions relieve the state
of a duty-it would otherwise have. In the case of religious institutions this
is no longer so clear, as constitutions in this country have abolished state
religion; but it is recognized that the -work of religious organizations contributes largely to welfare of the public, very much like that of charitable
organizations. Hence the two are often treated as the same. See also 14
Mci. L. Rrv. 646.
TAxATroN-JuR sDvcTcio-WHAT CONSTITUTS "DoiHa BusINss" UDmR
INHVgITANcz TAX LAw.-In the management of her estate, Mrs. Hetty Green

made extensive investments and reinvestments in New York. She was a
resident of Vermont and maintained hlo office or duly authorized agent in
New York, Tax Law, Sec. 22o, subd. 2, imposed a tax on transfers of capital
invested in business in the state by a non-resident "doing business" in the
state. This was an attempt by the state comptroller to put such a tax on her
estate. Held, the mahagement of an estate is not the doing of business within
the meaning of the statute. It re Green's Estate (ixgi) 178 N. 7. Supp. 353.
The problem encountered in such cases seems to be identical with that
involved in cases dealing with the jurisdiction of a state over a foreign
corporation "doing business" within the state so as to subject the corporation
to personal service of state process. The mere maintenance of an office, an
agent and clerks for soliciting trade was not "doing business" within the
state so as to subject the corporation to personal service of summons, in
Green v. C. B. & 0. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 530; but some cases look the other
way, St. Louis, Southwestern Ry Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218. See also
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17 MICH. L. Rlv. 507. The conflict in these cases is more apparent than real,
since the decision in each case must rest upon its own facts, the real question
always being whether there is sufficient business transacted in the state to
subject the corporation to the jurisdiction and laws of the state. The same
test seems to be applied in securing jurisdiction, for purposes of taxation,
over non-residents "doing business" within the state. In State v. Packard,
(N. D.) 168 N. W. 673, the court held a non-resident was not "doing business" within the state, where he had no established business or regular agent
or representative in the state, and only made loans and investments in the
state through an occasional agent, or on application of loan brokers, at his
home office in another state. The court said, in this case (quoting from
THomp. CoRPs., (and ed.) Sec. 6670) "'Business' and 'doing business' is
maintaining an office, having capital invested and carrying on a regular business; that is, maintaining an office and having regular capital invested and
carrying on a regular business in the state." Mrs. Hetty Green had no office
or agent in New York, but was only engaged in the private management of
her estate; making loans and investments of her own money for the benefit
of her estate only, and not for the purpose of making a livelihood. "Business, in a legislative sense; is that which occupies the time, attention, and
labor of men for purposes of livelihood or for profit; a calling for the
purpose of livelihood,"--State v. Boston Club, et al., 45 La. Ann. 545; Beickler
v. Guenther, 121 Ia. 419; Moore v. State, I5Ala. 41!; Barse Live Stock Comm.
Co. v. Range Valley Cattle Co. et. al., 16 Utah 59,-and it is clear in this
case that Mrs. Hetty Green was not engaged in making a livelihood, but
only in benefitting her private estate. See also 32 HARv.L. Rzv. 871, and 33
H4Av. L. REv. 238.

TORTS-MASTER AND SERVANT-INDUcING BREACH OF CONTRAcr.-Plaintiff
sued in tort action alleging that defendants naliciously induced the discharge
of plaintiff from his employment. Held, that such conduct is actionable.
Carter v. United States Coal Co. et al., (W. Va., 1919) 1oo S. E. 405.

The modern action for inducing breach of contract originated in the
common law action for enticing away scivants. In Hart v. Aldridge, Cowper
54 (1774) the defendant persuaded plaintiff's journeymen shoemakers to quit
their job and plaintiff recovered in an action on the case. The doctrine was
extended beyond the strict relation of master and servant in Lumley v. Gye,
2 El. & B. 216 (1853) where the plaintiff recovered because defendant induced
a singerr to break her contract to perform at plaintiff's theatre. Erie, J.,
reasoned that since it is an actionable wrong to break a contract, it must be
an actionable wrong to procure it to be broken. The doctrine was followed
in Glamorgan Coal Co. v. Miners? Federation, [19o] A. C. 239 and in Quinn
v. Leathem, [igoz] A. C. 495, at p. 510 it was said that "it is a violation of
a legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognized by law if there
be no sufficient justification for the interference." Courts in the United
States have generally adopted these views. See Booth v. Burgess, 72 N. J.
Eq. 181; royce v. Great Northern R. R. Co., 1oo Minn. 225; Angle v. Chicago.
etc. R. R. Co., I5!U. S. 13 where Brewer, J., said, "If one maliciously in-
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terferes in a contract between two parties and induces one of them to
break that contract, to the injury of the other, the party injured can maintain
an action against the wrongdoer.". In such statements of the law, malice
is clearly not intended to be taken in its popular meaning of ill-will, but in
its legal sense, as meaning a wrongful act done intentionally, without just
cause or excuse, and it was said by Lord Lindley in the Glamorgan Coal Co.
case,supra, that "when all that is meant by malice is an intention to commit
an unlawful act and to exclude all spite or ill-feeling, it is better to drop
the word and so avoid misunderstanding." One may maliciously (in the
popular sense) procure the discharge of the plaintiff and still not be liable
if his act was legally justified. Lancaster v. Hamburger, 70 Ohio St. x56.
But what is "just cause" or "legal justification" in such cases? There is
constant recurrence of those phrases in the decisions, but no clear opinion
has been expressed as to the facts or circumstances which will constitute
"just cause" or "legal justification." See observations in PoLLocx ON TORTS
9th ed., p. 336, ioth ed., p. 345; also Prattv. British Medical Ass'n., [igig] i
K. B. 244, commented upon in i8 MICH. L. Rzv. 148. In Walker v. Cronin,
307 Mass. 555 it was said that "competition or the service of any interest or
lawful purpose" is justification, but in Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205
the court held that the right to compete does not justify a person "in intentionally inducing a third person to take away from the plaintiff his contractual rights." That defendant was merely seeking his own economic
advancement is no justification. Beattie v. Callahan, 8r N. Y. Supp. 413;
3 CoL. L. Rzv. 426. There are numerous dicta as to what may constitute
justification, but (as was said in the Glamorgan Coal Co. case) the question
must remain to be decided in each case when it arises. Some of the authorities hold that an action like the principal case can not be maintained unless
unlawful means are employed by the defendant, such as fraud (Van Horn v.
Van Horn, 52 N. J. L. 284), deceit (Chambers and Marshall v. Baldwin, 9I
Ky. 1x2), or intimidation (Allen v. Flood,-I 898] A.-C. i; Perkins v. Pendleton, go Me. 166); coercion or deception (Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578;
Bourlier v. Macauley, gr Ky. 135). But most of the cases assert no such
requirement. See 2 Micn. L. REV. 305. A distinction (suggested in the
principal case) has been attempted between contracts of employment for
a definite period of time and those where either party may terminate the
relation at-will, but most cases repudiate such distinction. Donovan v. Berry,
x88 Mass. 353, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 899, note; London Guaranteeand Accident
Co. v. Horn, 2o6 I1. 49.3 : Perkins v. Penalet.,. go Me. 15. Contra: Holder
v. Mfg. Co., 138 N. C. 3o8. On the general subject of actions for inducing
breach of contract see i Mica. L. Rrv. 28-57; 2 id. 305; 4 id. 138; 5 id. 675;
9 id. 536; io id. 5o; 13 id. 43i; 16 id. 250; 18 id. x48. 8 HARv. L. REv. i;
II id. 4o5, 449-465.

TmHREALM-RGHT OF THP CROWN To TAxE PossEssioN"
LAND WJTHOUT ComPeNsAno.-In the spring of i916. the British War
Office decided to take over De Keyser's Royal Hotel to be used as an admin;strative office building for various military departments. Possession was
WAR-DiEENSE OF
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given up by its receiver with a reservation of all legal rights after charges
for rent, a matter which the parties had failed to agree upon. The Crown
claimed any compensation was payable only as a matter of grace. Suppliants
claimed the legal right thereto and requested to submit the question to a
referee to fix the amount. Held (Duke, L. J., dissenting), that suppliant
was entitled to remuneration as a matter of law. In re a Petition of Right
of De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Ltd., De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Ltd. v. The
King [1g'g] 2 Ch. 197.
The Court in a somewhat lengthy opinion exhausts the English cases involving the same question. Its decision is undoubtedly in conformity with
the weight of authority there. Leslie Scott, K. C., of counsel for 9uppliant,
also represented thesuppliants in the case of In re a Petition of Right [1915]
3 K. B. 649, chiefly relied upon by the Crown in the instant case. That
case involved the right to take property on the coast for an aerodrome and
was distinguished from the instant case on the ground of immediate military
necessity. As yet no American cases have arisen exactly in point. In White
v. Ivey, 34 Ga. I86, the Court held the statute authorizing "the impressment
of fords, articles of subsistence, or other property absolutely necessary" did
not authorize the impressment of a hotel or drug store for hospital purposes
on the ground that the enumeration in the statute controlled the general term
and was not intended to cover realty. In 1863, the Georgia Court decided in
Cunningham v. Campbell, 33 Ga. 645, that sugar could not be impressed without a tender and payment of adequate and reasonable compensation. More
to the point while not decisive, are some general observations by the Court
on the right of impressment. After referring to limitations similar to those
of the federal organ imposed by the Confederate Constitution the Court gives
"the repulsion of an invading army, the stay of pestilence or the arrest of
conflagration" as illustrations of great public necessity justifying seizure or
destruction of property without compensation. In Juragua Iron Company.
Ltd. v. The United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 99, the court held that a Pennsylvania
Corporation doing a mining business in Cuba was not entitled to compensation for the condemnation and destruction by fire, of a number of houses, to
prevent the spread of yellow fever among the soldiers quartered in the vicinity during the war with Spain, whether the property were considered to be
that of an alien enemy or an American. The argument of counsel and the
decision of Bamy, J., contained a review of the cases on the subject. On
appeal the case was affirmed, 29 Sup. CL 385. In United States v. Railway
Co., 120 U. S. 227, cited in the opinion in the Court of Claims, Field, J., says
"For all injuries and destruction which follow necessarily from these causes
(the prosecution of war) no compensation could be claimed from the Government. * * * Compensation has been made in several cases, it is true, but it
has generally been as stated by the President in his veto message 'a matter of
bounty rather than of strict legal rights.'" This statement in a measure approximates the view of the ex gratia payments in the English law. These
cases indicate that the modem doctrine on the subject is now quite similar
in both nations and as stated by one of the judges is now "a well settled
doctrine of public law."
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Wii;Ls-BQUXST OF "WZA2ING APPARI,--WHAT IS INCLUDED i.-After

making various other bequests of small things, the twenty-fifth clause of the
will gave to -three relatives, certain named property, including "my wearing
appareL" The personal property consisted of earrings, finger rings, bar breast
pins, a watch and chain, and a bracelet, of considerable value. Held, to include the watch and chain, but not the rest. In re Holden (i919) 178 N. Y.
Supp. 548.
The cases, construing the words "wearing apparel," are many and there
is a seeming utter confusion as to just what is included in this class. In
addition to the cases reviewed by the court in its opinion, various other cases
might be cited which only increase the confusion surrounding the problem as
to the proper construction of the words "wearing apparel." Many statutes
provide that "wearing apparel" of an insolvent or bankrupt shall be exempt,
and in general jewelry is not included in these exemptions. In re Everleth,
i2o Fed. 62o; Stewart v. McClung, 12 Ore. 43I; Smith v. Rogers, i6 Ga. 479,
where held would not include two watches, and doubtful whether it would
include one. In re Leech, I7I Fed.622, held that it depended upon whether
the jeweled rings were acquired and used as ornamental apparel, or as an
investment of value as a matter of business. Other cases hold that jewelry,
of one form or another, is in1cluded in this class. United States v. One Pearl
Chain, i39 Fed. 513, held a pearl chain was included; First National Bank v.
Robinson, (Tex.) 124 S. W. 177, held a diamond ring was included; Phillips
v. Phillips, i51 Ala. 527, held a ring, watch and chain were included; Mack
v. Parks,8 Gray 517, held a watch was included; In re Evans and Co., x58
Fed. 1.53. includes a gold watch and chain, cuff links, watch fob., gold ring
with diamond setting, scarf pins and shirt studs; Brown v. Edmonds, 8 S. D.
27i, held "wearing apparel" includes the idea of ornamentation, and therefore
includes a watch and chain; Sellers v. Bell, 94 Fed. 8ox, held "wearing apparel" includes whatever is necessary to a decent appearance and to protection against exposure to the changes of weather and also what is reasonably
proper and customary in the way of ornament. Sawyer v. Sawyer, 28 Vt.
249, cited by the court, seems to conflict with the instant case as to certain
pieces of jewelry, holding a bosom pin is included, but excluding a watch and
chain, key and seals, or finger ring. The court, in the present case, applied
the proper test by inquiring into testatrix's intent as manifested by the whole
will,-namely, considering all the provisions of the will-what did she intend
to include? The fact that she made various small bequests of like personal
property, and then made no other disposition of this jewelry shows she
intended it to be included in this provision, and the court will not hold
her intestate in regard to it. This case accords with In re Dox's 'Estate,30
Pa. Sup. Ct. 393, where the court held a bequest of "wearing apparel" did
not include jewelry because testator put in a clause, giving the residue of his
estate to his next of kin, which showed his intent not to give the jewelry in
the prior bequest. The confusion in these cases is more apparent than real,
inasmuch as the decision in each case must stand upon its own facts; and,
so far as there is a conflict it is between those cases which seek to arrive at
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testator's intent by considering the whole will, and those cases which lay
stress upon the matter of definition of the term "wearing apparel"
WiX--Co
NGZT Wir..-Deceased wrote a letter to her aunt, asking
her to dispose of her property. The first part of the writing was as follows:
"On Sunday evening I go to St. Elizabeth's Hospital to have a slight operation. I do not anticipate any trouble, but no one never knows. If anything
should happen to me, I want you * * * to do this for me. See that everything I have * * * goes to George B. G." Two days from the date thereof
the writer was taken to the hospital, where the operation was performed, and
some time later she left the institution fully recovered. About six months
later she died. The letter was never sent to the aunt, but was delivered by
deceased to George B. G., who offered it for probate. Held, a contingent
will, and hence not entitled to probate. Walker v. Hibbard, (Ky., 1919) 215
S. W. 80o.
The court distinguished those cases, on the one hand, where the instrument is written only to make provision against a death that might occur on
Account of, or as a result of, the specific thing assigned as a reason for writing the will, in which case it will be- a contingent will, and those cases, on
the other, where the causes assigned for writing it are merely a general
statement of the reasons or a nartative of the conditions that induced the
testator to make his will, in which case it will be a perfect testamentary
instrument. In the latter class the Kentucky court placed Likefield v. Likefeld, 82 Ky. s8g; Bradford v. Bradford, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 947; and Forquer's
Estate, 2z6 Pa. St. 331; and in the former Maxwell v. Maxwell, 3 Mete.
(Ky.) ior, and Morrow's Appeal, sz6 Pa. St.44o, as well as the instant case.
For a discussion of the question involved see 18 MicH. L. Rzv. x68, where
In re Tinsley's Will (Ia., igg), z74 N. W. 4, was considered. It will be
noted that the Tinsley case was rightly decided if the test laid down in the
instant case is applied, for the words there used, namely, "In case of any
serious accident," are general and not specific. In the case at hand the court
was correct when it held that the declarations of deceased at the time she
delivered the letter to the supposed devisee were inadmissible to show that
she intended to make the writing a permanent will. The authorities are in
accord that to allow such a course would be to nullify the parol evidence rule,
and would have the effect of permitting wills to be made partly by a writing
and partly by parol. Where, however, there is a latent 'ambiguity in the
instrument, such evidence is admitted in order to arrive at the real intent
of the testator. See, on this point, the Maxwell and Forquer cases, supra.
W=rs-SurricmxcY op DATE-OLOCRAPHIC WrL.-The date af an olographic will written thus, "9-8-8," was held to be insufficient under the civil
code of Louisiana, which declares that in order to be valid such will "must
be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator." Succession
of Beird, (La., i919) 82 So. 88r.
The statutory requirements as to olographic wills are strictly construed.
A striking example of this strictness is furnished by the case of Succession
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of Robertson, 49 La. Ann. 868, in which the date "igo" was held bad, the
first three digits of which were printed. In Estate of Billings, 64 Cal. 427, the
same result was reached where 'the month and day were written and the
year printed. A fortiori if the instrument bears no date at all, it is invalid
even though there is a recital therein that the testator is of a certain age.
Estate of Martin, 58 Cal. 53o. The same is true if the day of the month is
entirely wanting. Heffner v. Heffner. 48 La. Ann. zo88. While the reason for
the rigid construction of the date is impregnable, namely, that thereby fraudulent wills may be guarded against, it is submitted that such a date as
appears in the instant case is better evidence of the verity of the instrument
than would be the case if any one of the three items of the date were entirely
missing. The Louisiana court, however, lays much stress on the lack of
uniformity in the practice of substituting figures for the month and daysome persons writing the month first and the day second, others doing
exactly the reverse. See, however, the reasoning in Estate of Chevallier, 159
Cal. 161, contra. It should be noted also that in the instant case O'Neill, J.,
concurred in the result, but was of the opinion that there could be no uncertainty as to the century when the year and decade are given. In conformity with this view is Estate of Lakemeyer, 135 Cal. 28. On the whole
topic see the note in L. R. A. 1g16 E, 499. Such a technical construction as
was made in the principal case is justified, if- at all, only because olographic
wills are not favored. In many jurisdictions they are not effective unless
executed under the same formalities as other wills.

